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In drafting the Australian Constitution, the framers sought to maintain a federal 
balance in the distribution of powers between the Commonwealth and the states. They 
designed the Australian Constitution to be an instrument of government intended to 
distribute and limit governmental powers. Such distribution and limitation upon 
governmental powers was deliberately chosen by them because of the well-
substantiated understanding that concentration of power is often inimical to the 
achievement of human freedom and happiness.
1
  
This paper will be divided into two parts with the first part summarising the main 
characteristics of a federal system as a system of government worthy of protecting: it 
controls power, safeguards democracy and promotes liberty. And yet, the approach to 
constitutional interpretation preferred by the High Court since the 1920‟s has 
dramatically expanded Commonwealth power to the point where many of the 
advantages of federalism have now been lost.  
Centralisation indeed has been an on-going pursuit by the Commonwealth, aided by 
the High Court. The dramatic expansion of the powers of the Commonwealth has 
completely transformed the federal system in Australia, in a way that was not 
intended by the drafters of the Australian Constitution. This so being, the second part 
of our paper will consider the great need for reforming our „dysfunctional‟ federal 
system, thus offering the potential agenda for a comprehensive reform of the 
Australian Federation.        
Part I: Australian Federalism 
1. Characteristics of Federalism 
The first federal systems emerged via the coming together of a number of established 
polities that wished to preserve their separate identities and to some extent their 
autonomy.
2
 Some features are common to most, if not all, federal systems: 
distribution of power between central and local governments; a written and rigid 
constitution; an independent and impartial umpire to decide on disputes between these 
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levels of government; and representation of regional views within the central 
government.   
The type of political decentralisation provided by federalism is in contrast to a unitary 
system of government, which consists of one sovereign or central government. 
Although there may be regional units in unitary systems, any authority vested in them 
is merely delegated by the central government and can be resumed by it. In contrast, 
the central feature of every federal system is the separation of powers between central 
and local governments in such a way that each of them cannot encroach upon the 
power of another. A.V. Dicey explained3:  
“The distribution of powers is an essential feature of federalism. The object for 
which a federal state is formed involves a division of authority between the 
national government and the separate States. The powers given to the nation 
form in effect so many limitations upon the authority of the separate States, and 
as it is not intended that the central government should have the opportunity of 
encroaching upon the rights retained by the States, its sphere of action 
necessarily becomes the object of rigorous definition”.  
In federal systems the regional government enjoys a great degree of political 
autonomy derived directly from the federal Constitution. A federal Constitution is one 
which divides legislative power between a central government (Union or 
Commonwealth) and regional (state or provincial) governments. Such a constitution 
cannot be amendable unilaterally by any of the spheres of government. This prevents 
the usurpation of power by the central government of the regions‟ powers.  As the late 
W. Anstey Wynes pointed out4:  
“The division of powers between the Federal and State Governments being of 
the essence of federalism, it follows that the Constitution of the Federal State 
must almost necessarily be of the written and rigid, or controlled type. For, in 
order that the terms of the union may be adequately and permanently defined, 
the manner of apportionment of powers must be reduced to some definite and 
tangible form, not alterable by the central authority at will”. 
                                                 
3
  A. V Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Constitution (London: Macmillan, 1915), 83. 
4
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Federal systems also require an arbiter to decide over disputes between governments. 
As the power of the Federal State is constitutionally divided between the centre and 
the regions, disputes may arise as to the proper sphere of power to be exercised. So 
the protection of the federal system is vested in the hands of an independent and 
impartial constitutional arbiter. Without this the constitutional distribution of powers 
becomes a dead letter.
5
 As John Stuart Mill pointed out: 
“Under the more perfect mode of federation, where every citizen of each 
particular State owes obedience to two Governments, that of his own state and 
that of the federation, it is evidently necessary not only that the constitutional 
limits of the authority of each should be precisely and clearly defined, but that 
the power to decide between them in any case of dispute should not reside in 
either of the Governments, or in any functionary subject to it, but in an umpire 
independent of both. There must be a Supreme Court of Justice, and a system of 
subordinate Courts in every State of the Union, before whom such questions 
shall be carried, and whose judgment on them, in the last stage of appeal, shall 
be final. This involves the remarkable consequence… that a Court of Justice, 
the highest federal tribunal, is supreme over the various Governments, both 
State and Federal; having the right to declare that any law made, or act done by 
them, exceeds the powers assigned to them by the Federal Constitution, and, in 
consequence, has no legal validity”.6 
Finally, a federation involves linking institutions between each sphere, usually in the 
form of a bicameral legislature. In theory, the regions or states are represented in an 
upper house called the Senate whereby the representatives of each State must defend 
their particular regional interests. However, the reality is that in places like Australia 
and the United States the Senate has been divided along party lines in the same way as 
the lower house, or House of Representatives, thus not truly protecting the interests of 
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2. Australian Federalism 
Australia acquired the system of responsible government from England and those of 
bicameral Parliament and federal distribution of powers from the United States,
7
 thus 
establishing a federal system of responsible and representative government. The 
constitutional drafters favoured the federal system due to its recognised advantages of 
being able to promote democracy, protect the rights and liberties of citizen, and to 
prevent the concentration of power.
8
 Ever since Australia has comprised a Federation 
of six States (New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania and Western 
Australia) and two self-governing Territories (Australian Capital Territory and 
Northern Territory). Each of them is endowed with its own constitution, parliament, 
government, and laws. Moreover, the High Court has acknowledged that, together 
with separation of powers and representative government, federalism comprises one 
of the main institutional pillars of the country‟s constitutional order. In News Pty v 
Wills (1992) Deane and Toohey JJ argued that federalism is „one of the three main 
general doctrines of government which underlie the Constitution and are implemented 
by its provisions‟.9  
The Commonwealth of Australia is based on a symmetrical model of federalism, 
whereby each State maintains the same legal rights and responsibilities with the 
federal government. Aspects of the nation‟s symmetry are found in section 7, which 
provides for equality of representation amongst the original States in the Senate, and 
section 51 (ii), restricting the power of the federal government over taxation „so as not 
to discriminate between States or parts of States‟. Further evidence of symmetry are 
found in sections 51 (iii) and 88, providing uniformity to bounties and custom duties 
throughout the nation. Finally, section 99 determines that „the Commonwealth shall 
not, by any law or regulation of trade, commerce, or revenue give preference to one 
State or any part thereof over another State or any part thereof‟.  
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Formation of Australia’s Federalism  
Australia became a federation when it became a nation on 1st January 1901. The 
Commonwealth Constitution was drafted at two Conventions held in the 1890s. Some 
of the key issues during those conventions involved questions of finance and trade, 
and how to conciliate the interests of small States with those of the more populous 
ones. Also relevant was the issue about the preservation of the rights of the six 
existing colonies when they became States of the new federation.
10
  
The American model was especially attractive to the drafters of the Australian 
Constitution. According to Sir Owen Dixon, formerly Chief Justice of the High Court, 
those founders regarded the American system as an „incomparable model‟.11 
Elaborated in 1891 by Andrew Inglis Clark, a Tasmanian jurist who greatly admired 
the constitutional model of the United States, the first draft of the Australian 
Constitution followed quite closely that model. The general structure of that first draft 
continued into the constitution‟s final version which came into force in 1901.12  
The framers drew much of their inspiration from the works of A.V. Dicey and James 
Bryce. Lord Bryce was so influential that the inspiration for the official name of the 
nation, the Commonwealth of Australia, is said to derive from his classic The 
American Commonwealth.
13
 The drafters often quoted from him to explain things 
such as why the new federation should follow the American model of state rights and 
judicial review of legislation.    
Federal Distribution of Powers  
The Australian Constitution allocates the areas of legislative power to the 
Commonwealth in sections 51 and 52, with these powers being variously concurrent 
with the States and exclusive. Moreover, the federal Parliament has express and 
                                                 
10
  The drafters of the Australian Constitution created federalism by dividing power solely between the 
Commonwealth and the States. Although Australia has municipal powers such powers are not 
mentioned in the Federal Constitution. Local councils therefore exist only so long they are 
maintained by the States which create them. 
11
  O Dixon, „The Law and the Constitution” (1935) 51 Law Quarterly Review 597. 
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  N Aroney, Federalism and the Formation of the Australian Constitution 
from „Democracy Down Under: Understanding our Constitution‟ (PCV, 1997) 17. 
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  See J.A. La Nauze, The Making of the Australian Constitution (Melbourne University Press, 
Carlton, 1972). See also: J.A. La Nauze, „The Name of the Commonwealth of Australia‟, Historical 
Studies, vol.15, no.57, 1971.  
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implied incidental powers to deal with areas related to its grants of power. As such, 
the federal Parliament is allowed to make laws with respect to “matters incidental to 
the execution of any power vested by this Constitution in the Parliament”. The federal 
Parliament also has the power to legislate on matters which are incidental to the 
central purpose of its express heads of power.
14
  
The States were left with everything else. So, although the topics granted to the 
federal legislature are rather significative, ranging from areas such as marriage to 
quarantine and defence, numerous other areas of law, including health, education and 
industrial relations, remained with the States (former colonies) and were not included 
in the list of federal powers. The leading federalist at the first constitutional 
convention, Sir Samuel Griffith, provided the basic reason for such an arrangement, 
stating in 189115:  
“The separate states are to continue as autonomous bodies, surrendering only so 
much of their powers as is necessary to the establishment of a general 
government to do for them collectively what they cannot do individually for 
themselves, and which they cannot do as a collective body for themselves”. 
In fact, Deakin was convinced that the Constitution would succeed in protecting the 
independence of the States, asserting that
16
: 
“… so far from our Federal Government over-awing the States, it is more 
probable that the States will over-awe the Federal Government”. 
One of the most remarkable characteristics of the Australian Constitution is its 
express limitation on federal legislative powers. Whereas the legislative power of the 
central government is limited to the express provisions of the constitution, all the 
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  E Mills and M. Bagaric: “The distinction between the express incidental power of s 51(xxxix) and 
the implied incidental power was… referred to by the High Court in Gazzo v Comptroller of Stamps 
(Vic) (1981) 7 Fam LR 675 at 680; FLC parags 91-101 per Gibbs CJ, Stephen and Aickin JJ (the 
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incidental to the execution of one of the other substantive heads of constitutional power, while the 
implied incidental power concerns matters which are incidental to the subject matter of a 
substantive head of power. Together they enable the parliament to make any law which is directed 
to the aim or object of a substantive head of power, and any law which is reasonably incidental to 
its complete fulfilment”. – Family Law (Sydney: Butterworths, 2005) 12.  
15
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remaining residue was left undefined to the Australian States.
17
 The drafters of the 
Constitution thus wished to reserve to the people of each of State the right to decide 
by themselves on the most relevant issues through their own state legislatures. In a 
late edition of Introduction to the Study of the British Constitution, A.V. Dicey reveals 
why one of the main goals of the founders was to establish a considerably 
decentralised federal system for Australia18:    
“The Commonwealth is in the strictest sense a federal government. It owes its 
birth to the desire for national unity… combined with the determination on the 
part of the several colonies to retain as States of the Commonwealth as large a 
measure of independence as may be found compatible with the recognition of 
Australian nationality. The creation of a true federal government has been 
achieved mainly by following, without however copying in any servile spirit, 
the fundamental principles of American federalism. As in the United States so 
in the Australian Commonwealth the Constitution… fixes and limits the spheres 
of the federal or national government and of the States respectively, and 
moreover defines these spheres in accordance with the principle that, while the 
powers of the national or federal government, including in the term government 
both the Executive and the Parliament, are, though wide, definite and limited, 
the powers of the separate States are indefinite, so that any power not assigned 
by the Constitution to the federal government remains vested in each of the 
several States, or, more accurately, in the Parliament of each State. In this 
point… the States… retain a large amount of legislative independence. Neither 
the Executive nor the Parliament of the Commonwealth can either directly or 
indirectly veto the legislation, e.g., of the Victorian Parliament. The founders, 
then, of the Commonwealth have, guided in the main by the example of the 
United States, created a true federal government”.       
Inconsistency 
When a power to legislate on one or more topics is concurrently held by 
Commonwealth and the States, as it is found in section 51 of the Australian 
Constitution, a method has to be developed to resolve the possible conflicts between 
the laws of those different Parliaments. Section 109 provides the solution: “When a 
                                                 
17
  M Cooray, „A Threat to Liberty‟, in K Baker (ed.), An Australian Bill of Rights: Pro and Contra 
(Sydney: Institute of Public Affairs, 1986) 35.  
18
  A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Constitution (1885) (Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, 1982) 
387. (This edition is a reprint of the eighth edition published by MacMillan in 1915).  
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law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, 
and the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid”.  
Naturally, it is only a valid federal law which prevails over a valid State law. If a 
federal law goes outside its proper constitutional limits no question of inconsistency 
arises. The matter is simply of invalidity of the federal law as this is the case of 
federal violations of the distribution of powers established by the Constitution.   
The most accepted view about inconsistency is that a State law is not so much 
„invalid‟ because the State Parliament could not pass that type of legislation. Rather, 
the basic issue lies on the fact that the State law, though it was enacted with full 
validity by the State Parliament, happens to be inconsistent with a federal law and so 
it ceases to operate. But if the overriding federal law ceases to operate, then the 
inconsistent State law which was lying down dormant is automatically reactivated. As 
explained by Latham CJ in Carter v Egg Pulp Marketing Board (Vic)19: 
“[Section 109] applies only in cases where, apart from the operation of the 
section, both the Commonwealth and the State laws which are in question 
would be valid. If either is invalid ab initio by reason of lack of power, no 
question can arise under the section. The word „invalid‟ in this section cannot be 
interpreted as meaning that a State law which is affected by the section becomes 
ultra vires in whole or in part. If the Commonwealth law were repealed, the 
state would again become operative… Thus the world „invalid‟ should be 
interpreted as meaning „inoperative‟. This is, I think, made clear by the 
provision that the Commonwealth law „shall prevail‟ – that is, the 
Commonwealth law has authority and takes effect to the exclusion of the 
inconsistent State law”.  
Several are the occasions on which a conflict between a federal law and a State law 
may occur. Inconsistency arises whenever a State law cannot be obeyed at the same 
time as a Commonwealth law
20
. Inconsistency also occurs if a federal law allows 
something that a State law prohibits;
21
 or when a federal law confers some right or 
immunity that a State law seeks to remove.
22
 In addition, inconsistency may arise 
after the controversial „cover the field‟ test is applied. When the federal government, 
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  (1942) 66 CLR 557, 573. 
20
  Mabo v Queensland (1988) 166 CLR 186. 
21
  Colvin v Bradley Bros Pty Ltd (1943) 68 CLR 151. 
22
  Clyde Enginnering  Co Ltd v Cowburn (1926) 37 CLR 466. 
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either expressly or impliedly, evinces the intention to „cover the field‟, it is then 
imputed that only its laws must be applicable.  
The „cover the field‟ principle is nowhere found in the constitution. It was created by 
Isaacs J in Clyde Enginnering Co Ltd v Cowburn, in 1926. There Isaacs J argued that 
“if a competent legislature expressly or impliedly evinces its intention to cover the 
whole filed that is a conclusive test of inconsistency where another legislature 
assumes to enter to any extent upon the same field”.23 The test was later explained by 
Dixon J as it follows24:  
“When the Parliament of the Commonwealth and the Parliament of a State each 
legislate upon the same subject and prescribe what the rule of conduct shall be, 
they make laws which are inconsistent… But the reason is that, by prescribing 
the rule to be observed, the Federal statute shows an intention to cover the 
subject matter and provide what the law upon it shall be. If it appeared that the 
Federal law was intended to be supplementary to or cumulative upon State law, 
then no inconsistency would be exhibited in imposing the same duties or in 
inflicting different penalties. The inconsistency does not lie in the mere 
existence of two laws which are susceptible of simultaneous obedience. It 
depends upon the intention of the paramount legislature to express by its 
enactment, completely, exhaustively, or exclusively, what shall be the law 
governing the particular conduct or matter to which its attention is directed. 
When a Federal statute discloses such intention, it is inconsistent with it for the 
law of a State to govern the same conduct or matter”.  
Conceived by Isaacs J and endorsed the High Court in numerous subsequent cases, 
the „cover the field‟ test has been instrumental for the expansion of federal powers, at 
the expense of the powers originally conferred to the States. According to the late Sir 
Harry Gibbs, once Chief Justice of the High Court, the full adoption of the „cover the 
                                                 
23
  (1926) 37 CLR 466, 486. 
24
  Ex parte Leans (1930) 43 CLR 472, 483. A few years later, in Victoria v Commonwealth (‘The 
Kakariki’) 1937 58 CLR 618 Dixon J would give a shorter definition of the test. He said at 630: “It 
appears from the terms, the nature or the subject matter of a Federal enactment that it was intended 
as a complete statement of the law governing a particular matter or set of rights and duties, then for 
a State law to regulate or apply to the same matter or relation is regarded as a detraction from the 
full operation of the Commonwealth law and so is inconsistent”.  
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field‟ test “no doubt indicates that the Courts have favoured a centralist point of view 
rather than a federal one”.25 
3. The High Court on Federalism 
Every federation requires the establishment of a neutral power to determine whether 
either level of government – federal or state – has exceeded the constitutional limits of 
its respective legislative, executive or judicial powers. When Alfred Deakin 
introduced the Judiciary Bill into Federal Parliament, he made it very clear that the 
Australian courts were in charge of making sure that that the federal nature of the 
Commonwealth Constitution would be faithfully preserved. Deakin called the 
Australian High Court the „keystone of the federal arch‟.26  
In this sense, the late English constitutional lawyer AV Dicey, whose work deeply 
inspired the Australian founders, argued that judges who sit on the High Court are 
„intended to be the interpreters, and in this sense the protectors of the Constitution‟.27 
As Dicey also explained, „they are in no way bound… to assume the constitutionality 
of laws passed by the federal legislature‟.28   
During its two first decades of existence the High Court interpreted the 
Commonwealth Constitution in the way it was designed. First appointed in October 
1903, the court originally consisted of only three judges: Chief Justice Samuel 
Griffith and Justices Edmund Barton and Richard O‟Connor. Griffith had been the 
main leader of the Convention of 1891; Barton had been the leader of the Convention 
of 1897-8; and O‟Connor was one of Barton‟s closest associates during that 
convention. Therefore, as Professor Nicholas Aroney points out, „no one could have 
better understood the process by which the Constitution had been brought into being, 
the animating ideas and the pattern of debate than these three judges‟.29  
By adopting federal principles of constitutional interpretation the first members of the 
High Court faithfully sought to protect the federal nature of the Australian 
                                                 
25
  Harry Gibbs, „The Decline of Federalism?‟ (1994) 18 University of Queensland Law Journal 1, 3.  
26
  Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 8(1902), at 10967. Cited in G. Gallop, „The High Court: 
Usurper or Guardian? „(1995) 92 Legislative Studies, 60, 61.  
27
  A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Constitution (1885) (Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, 1982),  
 387-8 (This edition is a reprint of the eighth edition published by MacMillan in 1915). 
28
  Ibid. 
29
  N Aroney, „Constitutional Choices in the „Work Choices‟ Case, or What Exactly is Wrong with the 
Reserved Powers Doctrine‟ (2008) 32(1) Melbourne University Law Review 1, 15. 
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Constitution. They did so by upholding the Constitution in the way it was designed by 
its drafters. To that goal they borrowed from the United States the doctrine of states‟ 
„reserved powers‟ so as to ensure „that the residual legislative powers of the states… 
were not diminished through an expansive reading of the Commonwealth‟s legislative 
powers‟.30 So when a legislative power was found to belong to the States, the States 
would be entitled to the same level of independence in its exercise as is the central 
government in wielding its own authority. The states‟ reserved powers‟ doctrine thus 
dictates that each level of government must possess its own sphere of legislative 
independence. This entitlement to legislative independence was declared a State right. 
That was the position adopted by the High Court in its first years of existence. After 
all, as the late US constitutionalist Thomas M. Cooley commented31:  
“State rights consist of those rights which belonged to the States when the 
Constitution was formed, and have not by that instrument been granted to the 
Federal government, or prohibited to the States. They are maintained by 
limiting the exercise of federal power to the sphere which the Constitution 
expressly or by fair implication assigns to it”. 
The first judges of the High Court considered the „reserved powers‟ to directly derive 
from section 107 of the Australian Constitution. This section informs that „every 
power of the Parliament of a Colony which has become or becomes a State, shall, 
unless it is by this Constitution exclusively vested in the Parliament of the 
Commonwealth or withdrawn from the Parliament of the State, continue as at the 
establishment of the Commonwealth, or as at the admission or establishment or the 
State, as the case may be‟. As such, any grant of power which had not been explicitly 
given by the federal constitution to the central government must be interpreted as 
legislative powers „continuing‟ with the States. The intrinsic correlation between 
„reserved powers‟ and section 107 was clarified by the High Court in R v Barger 32:  
“The scheme of the Australian Constitution, like that of the United States of 
America, is to confer certain definite powers upon the Commonwealth, and to 
reserve to the States, whose powers before the establishment of the 
                                                 
30
  P Hanks et al, Australian Constitutional Law: Materials and Commentary (Chatswood; 
Buttersworth, 7
th
 ed, 2004), 569.  
31
  T. M. Cooley, Principles of Constitutional Law (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 3
rd
 edition, 
1898) 35-6.   
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  (1906) 6 CLR 41. 
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Commonwealth were plenary, all powers no expressly conferred upon the 
Commonwealth. This is expressed by sec.107 of the Constitution.”  
A second doctrine adopted by the early High Court to protect the federal system was 
called the „implied immunity of instrumentalities‟. Overall, this doctrine ensured that 
neither the Commonwealth nor the States were constitutionally allowed to control 
each other. In other words, both tiers of government – state and federal – must be 
generally immune from each others‟ laws and regulations, so that their respective 
„instrumentalities‟ (agencies) be protected from any external encroachment. The 
reason is that if federalism implies that each tier of government must enjoy a certain 
degree of independence in its own spheres of power, then none of them should be 
allowed to tell another what it might or might not do.   
History reveals that these two basic doctrines of federalism began to be eroded when 
Isaac Isaacs and Henry Higgins were appointed to the High Court, in 1906. These 
judges were politically inclined to expand Commonwealth powers and from the 
beginning they adopted a highly centralist reading of the Constitution. Isaacs and 
Higgins JJ had participated at both the 1897 and 1899 conventions. But they were in 
the minority most of the time and had no formal role in the drafting of the 
Constitution.
33
 As Walter Sofronoff points out, Isaacs was so unpopular amongst his 
peers “that despite his acknowledged skill and talent, he was excluded from the 
drafting committee which settled the final draft of the Constitution for consideration 
by the Conventions”.34  
There is a good reason, therefore, to question the reliability of their views concerning 
the underlying ideas and general objectives of Federation.
35
 Even so, in the 
Engineers’ Case, in 1920, Isaacs J successfully introduced a new method of 
interpretation whereby no areas of law were assumed to be reserved to the States. 
Thus the fact that Australia was constituted to be a federation was allowed to play “no 
significant part in determining the meaning and scope of the various powers conferred 
by s 51 of the Constitution”.36 Under Isaacs J‟s leadership, the High Court held in 
                                                 
33
  N Aroney, „Constitutional Choices in the Work Choices Case, or What Exactly is Wrong with the 
Reserved Powers Doctrine‟ (2008) 31(1) Melbourne University Law Review 1.    
34
  W Sofronoff, „Deakin and the Centralising Tendency‟, Quadrant  (September 2008) 86.  
35
  N Aroney, „Constitutional Choices in the Work Choices Case, or What Exactly is Wrong with the 
Reserved Powers Doctrine‟ (2008) 31(1) Melbourne University Law Review 1.    
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Engineers’ that the validity of federal industrial laws also regulated State business 
enterprises. Although an equal result could be reached by simply deciding that State-
owned business activities do not comprise basic governmental activity, the majority 
opted rather to overturn both the „implied immunity of instrumentalities‟ and the 
states‟ „reserved powers‟ doctrine on the grounds that section 107 is just about 
continuing State powers that are exclusive, or which are protected by express 
reservation in the Constitution. This is a gross misreading of section 107, which 
actually refers only to legislative power that is not exclusively granted to the federal 
government. And yet, ever since the Engineers’ Case was decided, Professor 
Geoffrey Walker writes37:     
“The reserved powers approach has been called unsupportable because s.107 
does not, unlike the Tenth Amendment [to the US Constitution], use the word 
"reserved". That is just an insubstantial matter of labelling. As s.107 says State 
powers "shall ... continue", the Court could just as easily have called it the 
"continuing powers" approach. If anything, s.107 is more forcefully expressed, 
as it saves "every" power and excepts only those powers "exclusively" vested in 
the Commonwealth, words of emphasis that do not appear in the American 
model. Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland pointed out that the 
word "expressly [delegated to the central government]" used in the 1781 
Articles of Confederation was dropped from the Constitution, probably 
deliberately.
26
 Griffith remarked on this in D'Emden v. Pedder, pointing out that 
s.107 was more definite than the Tenth Amendment.” 
The main problem with the majority decision in Engineers’ was their refusal to 
interpret the Constitution as a federal document. The court opted instead to interpret 
this merely as an Act of the Imperial (British) Parliament, meaning that any grant of 
federal power must be interpreted as expansively as possible. As early as 1906, in The 
Railway Servants’ Case38, Isaacs, in his capacity of Commonwealth Attorney-
General, could already be found advocating the same interpretative approach that as a 
High Court Justice he would apply in 1920. Back in 1906 Issacs submitted: 
“The Constitution must be dealt with in the same way as any other Imperial Act 
of Parliament. No prohibitions are to be implied in it… 
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The Australian Constitution is a grant and distribution of powers by the Imperial 
Parliament. The Constitutions of the States now depend on the Constitution of 
the Commonwealth.”  
Although justifiable by the fact that the Australian Constitution in its form was a 
statute of the Imperial Parliament, such an argument „completely overlooks the 
federal basis and structure of the Constitution as a whole‟.39 Since the drafters of the 
Constitution opted for defining only the federal powers specifically, and also 
explicitly informed that all the existing powers of the States must continue, there is an 
obvious reason to assume that the preservation of State powers in section 107 is 
logically prior to the conferral of federal power in section 51. Indeed, according to 
Professor Aroney, „such scheme suggests that there is good reason to bear in mind 
what is not conferred on the Commonwealth by s.51 when determining the scope of 
what is conferred. There is, therefore, good reason to be hesitant before interpreting 
federal heads of power as fully and completely as their literal words can allow‟.40  
Fortunately, even after Engineers’ the High Court has declared that there are certain 
things that the central government is not allowed to do. In Melbourne Corporation a 
federal law was declared invalid if it either discriminates against a State or if it 
impinges on the capacity of States to exist as „independent entities‟41. In practice, 
however, this principle has done little to restrict the expansion of Commowealth 
power, because it is not uncommon for the High Court to recognise the principle but 
then suggest that it has not been breached in the particular case.  Professor Cheryl 




“What is the utility of a principle which protects the formal existence of the 
States in a federation, or that nebulous concept of their capacity to function, 
while enabling them to be deprived of an unlimited and unpredicted range of 
functions or the revenue resources to meet those functions?” 
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Indeed, the fundamental problem of (unconstitutional) centralisation has not been 
altered, among other things because the general method of interpretation espoused by 
Isaacs has prevailed as the most frequently adopted by the High Court, so that the 
supremacy of the Commonwealth has been judicially assured.
43
       
External Affairs and the Constitution  
A significant example of the High Court‟s centralist approach is observable in the 
interpretation given to section 51(xxix) of the Constitution, which says: „The 
Parliament shall have, subject to this Constitution, the power to make laws for the 
peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to external 
affairs‟.  
The Federal Executive has entered into many thousands of treaties on a wide range of 
matters. Numerous of these international agreements are related to topics not 
otherwise covered by the enumerated powers of the Constitution, and which the 
Commonwealth Parliament has been able to legislate on by enacting laws 
implementing them.  
The High Court has traditionally rejected the argument that s 51(xxix) should not be 
limited to the external aspects of matters covered by other paragraphs of s 51. In 
1936, in R v Burgess; Ex parte Henry, the majority (Latham CJ, Evatt and McTiernan 
JJ) held that s 51 (xxix) should not be restricted to a power only to make laws with 
respect to the external aspects of the other subjects mentioned in s51. For Latham CJ, 
it would be „impossible to say a priori that any subject is necessarily such that it could 
never properly be dealt with by international agreement‟44.  
In his dissenting judgment, however, Starke J criticised that decision by commenting 
that the external affairs power should be limited to situations where the subject of the 
treaty is „of sufficient international significance to make it a legitimate subject for 
international co-operation and agreement‟.45 Similarly, Dixon J dissented in these 
terms46:  
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“It seems an extreme view that merely because the Executive Government 
undertakes with some other country that the conduct of persons in Australia 
shall be regulated in a particular way, the legislature thereby obtains a power to 
enact that regulation although it relates to a matter of internal concern which, 
apart from the obligation undertaken by the Executive, could not be considered 
as a matter of external affairs.”  
In 1983, a treaty to protect world heritage areas was used to pass a federal law 
preventing the building of a dam in an area in Tasmania. In the Tasmanian Dam Case, 
the majority upheld the validity of that law on the basis that the mere entry by the 
federal Executive into an international treaty is enough to justify a law which gives 
effect to obligations imposed by that treaty, even if such obligations are related only 
to domestic conduct, not to relations between countries.
47
  
There is a wide range of international treaties and conventions which can be used to 
underpin a federal legislation. The Commonwealth can undermine federalism just by 
making a greater use of the external affairs power, without having to rely on any co-
operation by the States. Sir Harry Gibbs once argued that, together with the regular 
operation of s109 (inconsistency) of the Constitution, the external affairs power has 
the potential to „annihilate State legislative power in virtually every respect‟.48 In the 
Tasmania Dam Case, Gibbs CJ declared49:  
“The division of powers between the Commonwealth and the States which the 
Constitution effects could be rendered quite meaningless if the federal 
government could, by entering into treaties with foreign governments on 
matters of domestic concern, enlarge the legislative powers of the 
[Commonwealth] Parliament so that they embraced literally all fields of 
activity… Section 51 (xxix) should be given a construction that will, so far as 
possible, avoid the consequence that the federal balance of the Constitution can 
be destroyed at the will of the Executive.”  
The above concerns have not been accommodated. Rather, the High Court has given 
the power to the Commonwealth Parliament to legislate on any area of law covered by 
a bona fide international instrument. Thus what this Parliament could not do under the 
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Australian Constitution it can now do by virtue of treaty obligations. As a result of 
judicial decisions, federal supremacy has been achieved, because the central 
government can acquire more legislative power simply by agreeing to ratify those 
treaties.
50
 This possibility was recognised by Dawson J, who saw a broad 
interpretation of the external affairs power as having “the capacity to obliterate the 
division of power which is a necessary feature of any federal system and our federal 
system in particular”51. 
Industrial Relations and the Constitution 
For a long time it was argued that the Commonwealth‟s power over industrial 
relations was restricted only to the conciliation and arbitration. After all, s 51 (xxxv) 
of the Constitution gives the Commonwealth a very limited power over the subject of 
industrial relations. Under this subsection of s 51, the federal government‟s power to 
regulate industrial relations extends only to matters of „conciliation and arbitration‟ of 
industrial disputes „extending beyond the limits of any one State‟ to which the grant 
of power refers. 
The idea that the Commonwealth Government should have more power to legislate 
with respect to industrial disputes was first introduced by South Australian Premier 
Charles Cameron Kingston, in 1891. He contended that the Commonwealth 
Parliament should be able to make laws „for the establishment of courts of 
conciliation and arbitration, having jurisdiction throughout the Commonwealth, for 
the settlement of industrial disputes‟.52 The reason for this, according to Nicola Petit, 
is that „the strikes of the early 1890‟s were fresh in the framer‟s minds and both the 
supporters and opposers of a federal industrial disputes power saw the industrial 
conflicts as an „evil‟ that must be avoided‟.53  
 Although Kingston withdrew his proposal before delegates could vote on the subject, 
a new proposal was presented by Henry Higgins of Victoria, in 1897. He argued that 
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the federal government should have the power to legislate with respect „to conciliation 
and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending 
beyond the limits of any State‟.54 Although these are now the words of s51 (xxxv), 
Higgins proposal was soundly defeated (22 to 12) because some of the delegates were 
concerned that industrial disputes were essentially local in character.
55
   
Higgins put the same proposal again in 1898, and, at this time, the conciliation and 
arbitration power was narrowly adopted 22 to 19. Arguably, many delegates who 
voted for the inclusion did so only because they thought that subsection would not be 
used and so there would be no harm in including it. Even so, delegates such as 
McMillan of New South Wales expressed the concern that disputes could be 
manufactured in order to come under federal jurisdiction. Overall, writes Louise 
Clegg56: 
“There is no doubt that the architects of the Constitution assumed that the States 
would be responsible for the regulation of industrial relations generally. The 
intention was that the Commonwealth should only be permitted to make laws 
supporting the resolution (by conciliation and arbitration) of a small number of 
interstate industrial disputes.”  
That did not happen to be the case and McMillan‟s fears were actually fulfilled when 
the High Court broadened the reach of the industrial disputes, in 1914. In R v 
Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; Ex parte GP Jones (the 
‘Builders Labourers Case’)57, „paper disputes‟ (the use of written „logs of claims‟ 
served on employers) were declared by the High Court to be sufficient to generate an 
interstate industrial dispute. The unions had created excessive log of claims, which 
then were sent to as many employers as possible across State borders. These claims 
were excessive precisely to ensure that the employers‟ would dispute them.  
Although these paper disputes enabled many people to come under federal 
jurisdiction, the Commonwealth Parliament still had a limited power to legislate with 
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respect to industrial disputes. The conciliation and arbitration power is a (limited) 
purposive power that has far more limitations than other plenary powers of the 
Constitution. Hence, just ten years after Federation, the federal Labor government 
tried to expand its reach into industrial affairs by referendum. The referendum failed, 
as did five others put forward by federal Labor governments in 1913, 1919, 1944, 
1946 and 1973. The Nationalist Party also unsuccessfully put forward a proposal law 
affecting industry and commerce in 1926.     
Frustrated by the people‟s reluctance to expand the federal power over the subject 
matter, the Commonwealth Government sought a way to free itself from such 
limitations by turning to other grants of legislative power by the Constitution. Other 
heads of power in s 51 have been used to expand the Commonwealth‟s reach over 
industrial affairs, because the High Court has seen no implication in the constitutional 
text that the words of the arbitration and conciliation power should limit the use of 
other powers in s 51 by the Commonwealth to legislate over industrial matters. As 
Professor Williams points out,58  
“Certain powers may be particularly useful in complementing the law of 
coverage of other powers. Indeed the current regime of industrial regulation… 
is based upon a web of complementary powers… For example, because s 51 
(xxxv) limits the Commonwealth to “conciliation and arbitration”, the 
Commonwealth has relied upon its power under s 51 (i) and s 51 (xx) to support 
legislation introducing “Australian Workplace Agreements” (“AWAs”) between 
employers and individual employees. Similarly, the Commonwealth has relied 
upon s 51 (xxix) to enact provisions relating to parental leave in the workplace.”     
The industrial relations reforms in the 1990s saw section 51(xx) - the corporations 
power – emerging as a major source of power to rival the original reliance on the 
conciliation and arbitration power. Section 51(xx) of the Constitution confers power 
on the federal government to make laws with respect to foreign corporations, and 
trading or financial corporations formed within the limits of the Commonwealth.  
The Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) and its successor, the ‘Work Choices’ Act 
2005 (Cth), are substantially based on the use of the corporations power. Indeed, key 
definitions on the „Work Choices‟ rely primarily on this head of power, namely the 
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provisions removing employers and employees from State workplace systems, and 
those implementing the Australian Fair Pay Commission and its prescription of 
minimum working conditions. Where federal and State laws are in conflict, s 109 of 
the Commonwealth Constitution resolves the matter in favour of the former. 
According to Williams59:  
“Section 109 is a powerful means by which the Commonwealth Parliament 
can ensure the supremacy of its legislation within the field of industrial 
relations… State legislation and awards are not only rendered inoperative 
where they are directly inconsistent with a federal law or award, but also 
where a State law or award intrudes into an area where a federal law or award 
indicates an intention to „cover the field.”  
The Work Choices Case 
In 2005 the Commonwealth enacted the Work Choices Act, which sought to create a 
national industrial relations system throughout Australia. This system would be based 
mainly on section 51(xx) of the Constitution.  As a result, all „constitutional 
corporations‟ formed within the limits of the Commonwealth and their employees 
were covered by this national industrial relations system 
The State and Territory Governments expressed strong opposition to the move 
towards centralization that Work Choices had brought about. They considered Work 
Choices a hostile takeover by the federal government on the several State industrial 
relations systems 
On 21 December 2005 the New South Wales Government filed its writ in the High 
Court, challenging the constitutional validity of the Work Choices Act. A total of 
seven actions were commenced seeking declarations of invalidity of the whole Act, 
or, alternatively, of specific provisions. The challenge provided the High Court with 
an opportunity to clarify the scope of the corporations power. The most important 
issue in the case was the constitutional basis of the legislation.   
In New South Wales v Commonwealth [2006] HCA 52, a five-to-two majority of the 
Court held that the Commonwealth Parliament had power to create a national 
industrial relations system under the corporations power. In a joint judgement, 
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Gleeson CJ and Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ declared that „laws 
prescribing the industrial rights and obligations of constitutional corporations and 
their employees and the means by which they are to conduct their industrial relations 
are laws with respect to constitutional corporations‟60. 
One of the main arguments against the validity of Work Choices was that the 
corporations power was not the appropriate head of power for regulating industrial 
relations. The appropriate head of power is found in s51 (xxxv) and it limits this 
power only to matters of conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement 
of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State.  The Plaintiffs 
contended that a wide reading of another head of power should be limited if there is a 
clear restriction that is based on the express language used in the Constitution.  
The majority did not accept that express limitation of the Constitution. Rather, they 
followed a centralist approach in which so long as a law could be characterized as a 
law with respect to a subject-matter within the legislative power, it did not matter that 
it also affects a different subject-matter altogether. In other words, a head of power 
does not have to be read narrowly so as to avoid it actually breaching the explicit 
limitations of another head of power. This so being, the Court concluded that the 
express limitation contained under s 51(xxxv) can be rendered otiose by the broad 
reading of s 51(xx).  
In his dissenting judgment Kirby J emphasised the need to adopt a narrow approach to 
the corporations power, stating that a broad view “went a long way to destabilising 
the federal nature of the Australian Constitution”. He deeply criticised the majority in 
Work Choices for not properly considering that the preservation of the country‟s 
federal system requires the Commonwealth Constitution to be read as a whole. 
According to Kirby J61: 
“In the interpretation of legal words, it is accepted today that serious errors 
can result from focusing on the words alone, in isolation, and omitting the 
context in which those words appear. Paying regard to context is now a settled 
requirement for the construction of statutes. The same is true in ascertaining 
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the meaning of a constitutional provision. Context is critical to the 
understanding of communication by the use of human language. This is 
nowhere more so than in deriving the meaning of a constitutional text, 
typically expressed (as in the Australian instance) in sparse language, 
designed to apply for an indefinite time and to address a vast range of 
predictable and unpredictable circumstances…  
It follows that, to take the language of the corporations power in par (xx) of 
s51 in isolation and to ignore the other paragraphs of that section, would 
involve a serious mistake… Clearly, it was not intended that s 51(xxxv) 
should be otiose, irrelevant or entirely optional to the Commonwealth in its 
application. Nor was it intended that the important restrictions imposed on the 
federal exercise of legislative powers in par (xxxv), with respect to laws on 
industrial disputes, should be set at nought by invoking another head of power, 
such as that contained in par (xx)... 
It is not irrelevant that the legislative power conferred on the Federal 
Parliament by s 51(xxxv) appears amongst the powers granted towards the end 
of the list in s 51. Each of the immediately preceding legislative powers (s51 
(xxxi), (xxxii), (xxxiii) and (xxxiv)) contains a grant of power subject to a 
“safeguard, restriction or qualification”. As a matter of structure, therefore, it 
would not be surprising to view s 51(xxxv) in the same light. History and the 
Convention debates, suggest the same conclusion.” 
Justice Callinan, who also dissented, agreed that the Constitution must be read as a 
whole. He argued that the Court‟s „centralizing principles‟ have produced “eccentric, 
unforeseen, improbable and unconvincing results”, which as a result have threatened 
the federal structure of the Constitution. Why, he asked, “should the text of the 
Constitution be so read as to pre-empt the exercise of other heads of legislative power 
to which s 51(xxxv) could not apply?” The answer, Callinan said, “is that the only 
place in the constitution in which the text refers to industrial matters is in that 
placitum; and, secondly, that if control over industrial affairs were to be imported into 
the subject matter of virtually every placitum of s 51, there would be little of 
substance left for the States in this area of importance for them”. Nonetheless, he 
explained62:   
                                                 
62
  New South Wales v Commonwealth (Work Choices Case) (2006) 229 CLR 1, [798], [822], [834].  
25 
 
“There may be, indeed there is in some cases, a clear possibility of some 
overlapping [between s51 powers], but instance of it are likely to be rare and 
slight, and a construction which allows them should wherever possible, be 
avoided, for two reasons: that it is unlikely that the authors of the Constitution 
intended to repeat themselves, or did so by accident; and because it is an 
elementary principle of construction that each word and phrase of an instrument 
has its own work to do… 
It is the natural order to deal with s 51(xxxv) before the corporations power 
because, from beginning to end the Act is an Act concerned with industrial 
matters. Only s 51(xxxv) in the whole of the Constitution refers to, and confers 
power upon the Commonwealth with respect to those. It is, in my opinion, an 
inversion of logical order to go first to the corporations power, so as to try to 
find somewhere in it a power to regulate industrial affairs, and having chosen to 
do so, necessarily to confine or reduce the operation of s 51(xxxv). The more 
expansive the industrial power can be seen to be, the more likely it is that the 
power is the only power of the Commonwealth to legislate about industrial 
affairs… 
Because of the extent of the power conferred by s 51(xxxv), as repeatedly held 
by the Court, as well as its usage alone of all the placita, of the language of 
industrial affairs, it can be seen to represent the totality of the Commonwealth‟s 
powers of control of industrial affairs, and to give rise to a negative or 
restrictive implication of the absence of a conferral of industrial power 
elsewhere under s 51, except of course in relation to employees of the 
Commonwealth and perhaps other limited categories of employees which it is 
unnecessary to define in this case. I would not regard this holding, of a negative 
implication, as different in substance from the holding of Kirby that s 51(xx) be 
read down so as to exclude its application to industrial affairs.” 
According to Callinan J, the decision reached by the majority in Work Choices would 
“subvert the Constitution and the delicate distribution or balancing of powers which it 
contemplates”. Such a broad view of the corporations power, he explained, has the 
potential to reduce the States to “mere façades of authority possessing Parliaments 
and courts but little else”. As His Honour reminded63:  
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“There is nothing in the text or the structure of the Constitution to suggest that 
the Commonwealth‟s powers should be enlarged, by successive decisions of 
this Court, so that the Parliament of each State is progressively reduced until it 
becomes no more than an impotent debating society. This Court too is a creature 
of the Constitution. Its powers are defined in Ch III, and legislative made under 
it. The Court goes beyond power if it reshapes the federation. By doing that it 
also subverts the sacred and exclusive role of the people to do so under s 128.”  
The result in Work Choices represented the continuation of how the High Court has 
approached the Constitution since the Engineers’ Case, in 1920. It confirms the 
centralist method adopted by the High Court, which has given the Commonwealth the 




The Money Problem  
Perhaps the least satisfactory aspect of Australian federalism is its vertical fiscal 
imbalance.
65
 The High Court has allowed for the expansion of Commonwealth 
powers in areas of taxation that were not envisaged by the drafters of the Constitution. 
The States have become heavily dependent on the Commonwealth for their revenue 
and any semblance of balance has largely disappeared. This expansion of federal 
taxation powers has occurred, among other things, as a result of its exclusive control 
over levying of income tax. The drafters of the Australian Constitution, however, 
wished to secure the States‟ financial position and independence. At federation, in 
1901, only the States levied income tax. After the Uniforms Tax Cases of 1942 and 
1957, the High Court upheld the federal takeover of the income tax system.  
By 1942 the Commonwealth sought to obtain the exclusive control over the income 
tax system. It was argued that the war effort required this to be so. Thus a series of 
bills were passed that: a) prohibited taxpayers from paying State income tax until 
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Commonwealth tax had been paid; b) provided that the rate of federal income tax was 
so high that it became politically impossible for the States to levy a concurrent income 
tax; c) allowed the Commonwealth Parliament to provide for a grant in order to 
compensate the States that refrained from imposing their income taxes.  
The High Court approved the above scheme in South Australia v Commonwealth 
(First Uniform Tax Case)
66
. Since the Commonwealth continued to monopolise the 
income tax system, even after the war was over, a second challenge was made against 
the statutory regime. In Victoria v Commonwealth (Second Uniform Tax Case)
67
, the 
Court confirmed the Commonwealth power to impose whatever conditions it saw fit 
on the grant of money to the States 
The drafters of the Constitution conferred upon the Commonwealth the power to levy 
customs and excise duties so as to develop a national common market (s90). And yet, 
they sought also to limit it by specifying that any surplus revenue derived from these 
two federal taxes be apportioned to the States. This was done so as to prevent any 
serious dislocation to the States‟ finances, especially during the transition from 
colonial to Federal government. They reached a compromise with the draft of sections 
87, 89 and 93. In brief, any excess revenues should be returned to the States during a 
specified period of time. Once that time expired, s. 96 would give power to the 
Commonwealth to grant financial assistance „to any State on such terms and 
conditions as the Parliament thinks fit‟.  
The High Court has allowed section 90 to be used subject to any conditions the 
Commonwealth chose to impose.
68
 As a result, the States were induced to achieve 
objects on behalf of the Commonwealth which the Commonwealth itself could not 
achieve under its enumerated powers, effectively giving it the power to implement 
policies that otherwise would be unconstitutional.  
Special purpose grants are moneys transferred pursuant to s.96 which the 
Commonwealth provides on conditions that are directed towards a certain objective 
which lies outside its enumerated powers. These conditions may be directed to any 
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 and housing. In Pye v 
Renshaw
71
, the Court upheld the use by the Commowealth of s 96 to grant money to 
the States, provided it is used to effect the compulsory purchase of land for returning 
servicemen at less than its value. As a result, the Commonwealth evaded the s.51 
(xxxi) requirement that property must be acquired on just terms.  Section 96 grants 
have become, as Sir Robert Menzies put it
72
: 
“… a major, and flexible instrument for enlarging the boundaries of 
Commonwealth action; or, to use realistic terms, Commonwealth powers”. 
In Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) v W R Moran Pty Ltd
73
 the High 
Court upheld a federal scheme in which a tax was imposed on flour millers through 
Australia by one Act, while another Act provided for the reimbursement to Tasmania 
of revenue raised from millers in that State as a s 96 grant. As a result, the 
Commonwealth was allowed to tax all the States except Tasmania. The majority 
argued that section 51(ii) was not breached because the tax had been raised equally, 
even though the unequal distribution cancelled its effect in Tasmania. In other words, 
the Court allowed the Commonwealth to evade from its obligations under section 
51(ii) by raising revenue equally but then granting it unequally as between States or 
parts thereof. 
Whereas section 51(ii) assures that federal taxation laws cannot discriminate between 
States or parts of States, section 99 states that these laws cannot create preferences to 
the States or part of States. These prohibitions operate in different ways. Section 
51(ii) applies only to „laws‟ on the field of taxation, whereas section 99 applies to any 
„laws or regulations‟ involving trade, commerce, or revenue. Both however are 
conceived to restrict the Commonwealth government, although the States remain free 
to introduce tax laws that may discriminate between parts of their own territory. 
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Finally, section 114 adds to the list of guarantees and protections to the States by 
prohibiting the Commonwealth from taxing any State property, and vice-versa. 
The classical definition of tax in Australia is found in Matthews v Chicory Marketing 
Board
74
, where the High Court held that tax is a compulsory exaction by a public 
authority for public purposes which is not a fee for services and a penalty. As such, 
fines, penalties and fees for licenses or services do not amount to taxes.  
Section 90 of the Constitution prohibits the States from levying customs duties and 
excise duties. Customs duty is a tax imposed on goods imported into, or exported out 
of, Australia. Excise duty is a tax which is imposed on goods which are already in 
circulation in Australia. Whereas section 90 prohibits the States from levying customs 
duties and excise duties, it fails however to provide a clear definition to these taxes. 
The vast majority of section 90 cases involve claims by individuals that a State has 




In Parton v Milk Board (Vic), the High Court held that section 90 is not confined only 
to prohibiting the state from imposing taxes upon production and manufacture, but 
upon sale and distribution as well. According to Dixon J, “a tax upon a commodity at 
any point in the course of distribution before it reaches the consumer produces the 
same effect as a tax upon its manufacture or production” 76.  
Since the decision in Milk Board the Court has gradually broadened its approach in 
identifying and characterising excise duties. The Court has examined whether the tax 
or levy in question is related to production, manufacture, sale, or distribution of 
goods. If such relationship can be established then the tax or levy is interpreted as an 
excise duty and cannot be imposed by a State.  
The financial problems of the States have been aggravated by decisions of the High 
Court that have not allowed them, among other things, to raise their own income 
taxes. The States cannot raise anywhere near the revenue they need. Over the 2005 to 
2006 financial year “the Commonwealth collected over 80% of taxation revenue 
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(including the GST), but was responsible for 54% of government outlays”.  On the 
other hand, “the States collected only 16% of taxation revenue and accounted for 
around 39% of outlays”.77 As a result of these court decisions, the States have turned 
to new sources of taxation such as gambling, and have remained heavily dependent on 
Commonwealth grants. When the federal government grants money to them it often 
does so with strings attached, although “the States have no real choice but to accept 
the money, even at the cost of doing the Commonwealth‟s bidding”.78  
Conclusion 
Although the Australian Constitution‟s federal structure, particularly its limited 
powers conferred upon the Commonwealth Parliament, does not support the idea that 
the express grants of power should be interpreted as fully and completely as their 
literal words might mean, such an approach still remains the most common guiding 
principle of interpretation by the High Court.
79
   
If the High Court wishes to protect the federal system it must start by enforcing the 
explicit limitations contained in the constitutional text. Above all, the High Court 
needs to rediscover the federal nature of the Australian Constitution, meaning that it 
will have to consider that the treatment given by constitutional law to the Australian 
States „by no means implies that federal legislative power is to be accorded 
interpretative priority‟.80  
Any amendment to the Constitution needs to be submitted to the approval of the 
Australian people. Under section 128, the Australian people have the final say on 
whether a proposed constitutional amendment must be accepted. Such approval needs 
to come from the majority of the electorate as a whole as well as the majority of the 
electorate in the majority of the States.  
Since the beginning of Federation 44 amendment proposals have been presented to 
the people. Only 8 of them were carried. The last referenda, in 1999, which proposed 
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the abolition of monarchy and the writing of a new preamble for the Constitution, 
were soundly defeated.  
Curiously, no less than 26 of all these amendment proposals involved any attempt to 
enlarge the Commonwealth power. Only 2 of them were carried: the social services 
proposal and the 1967 proposal to repeal a discriminatory reference to Aborigines. 
The Australian people themselves have consistently rejected proposed expansions of 
Commonwealth powers.  
The High Court‟s centralist reading of the Constitution has effectively done in 
practice what the Australian people themselves have explicitly rejected.  As Justice 
Callinan reminds in his dissenting judgment in Work Choices: “If the Parliament 
could not convince the people to change, it‟s not for the Court to subvert their will by 
making the change for them”.  
Unfortunately, this is precisely what the High Court has done. The High Court‟s 
failure to preserve the federal structure of the Constitution has displaced the exclusive 
right of the people to effect constitutional change as envisaged by section 128. The 
implication is that all the advantages of federalism sought by the Australian founders 
have actually diminished over time, in no small part due to the actions of the High 
Court of Australia.   
Part II: One Indissoluble Federal Commonwealth? The Need for Reform 
1. Advantages of Federalism 
The initial question that must be asked before considering the key issues and priorities 
for the reform of the Australian Federation is whether Australia‟s basic governmental 
structure should continue to be a Federal Commonwealth?  Does federalism still have 
a place in 21
st
 century Australia?  Is there any value in recognising federalism as one 
of our guiding constitutional principles?  In our view, the answer to these questions 
must be a resounding and unequivocal yes. 
Associate Professor Anne Twomey and Professor Glenn Withers have previously 
noted the somewhat unusual disconnect between current Australian attitudes towards 
federalism and the prevailing attitude in the rest of the world.  The modern 
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international trend is strongly towards federalism and decentralized government.  As 
Twomey and Withers stated
81
: 
“In Australia, it is often asserted that federalism is an old-fashioned, 
cumbersome and inefficient system.  Yet internationally, federalism is 
regarded as a modern, flexible and efficient structure that is ideal for 
meeting the needs of local communities while responding to the 
pressures of globalization.  The difference between these two views is 
stark”. 
Beyond the simple reality that there would be enormous practical difficulties 
associated with attempting to govern a country the size of Australia with a single, 
centralized government, there are numerous other advantages apparent in a federal 
system.  A direct comparison of federal and unitary governments suggests that federal 
arrangements tend to produce more stable governments, more efficient governments, 
higher rates of economic growth, and greater integrity in government
82
.  If we were to 
look at quantifying this benefit, it has been suggested that “... the specific advantage 
achieved by Australia through the federal structure itself is a sum of $4,507 per capita 
in 2006 – or $11,402 per average household”83.  Twomey and Withers go on to 




Twomey and Withers conclude that federalism is the right political structure for 
Australia.  A well-designed federal system has a number of advantages over a unitary 
system of government.  The broad sweep of advantages can be categorised into three 
key areas: the plurality achieved through increased participation and access to the 
political system; regional autonomy and diversity7; and innovation and competitive 
efficiencies
85
.  Professor Geoffrey Walker writes
86
: 
                                                 
81
  A Twomey and G Withers, Australia’s Federal Future: Delivering Growth and Prosperity 
(Federalist Paper I) (April 2007), 2. 
82
  A Twomey and G Withers, Australia’s Federal Future: Delivering Growth and Prosperity 
(Federalist Paper I) (April 2007), 2, 8; G de Q Walker, “Ten Advantages of a Federal Constitution” 
(Centre for Independent Studies, Sydney, 2001). 
83
  A Twomey and G Withers, Australia’s Federal Future: Delivering Growth and Prosperity 
(Federalist Paper I) (April 2007), 41. 
84
  Ibid, 41. 
85
  A Heywood, Politics, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2
nd
 ed, 2002), 10. 
86




“An awareness of the positive benefits of federalism will make the 
constitutional debate a more equal and fruitful one.  This will mean recognizing 
that, in a properly working federation, government is more adaptable to the 
preferences of the people, more open to experiment and its rational evaluation, 
more resistant to shock and misadventure, and more stable.  Its decentralized, 
participatory structure is a buttress of liberty and a counterweight to elitism.  It 
fosters the traditionally Australian, but currently atrophying, qualities of 
responsibility and self-reliance.  Through greater ease of monitoring and the 
action of competition, it makes government less of a burden on the people.  It is 
desirable in a small country and indispensable in a large one.  And if, as is often 
said, the pursuit of truth in freedom is the essence of civilization, this „liberating 
and positive form of organization‟ has a special contribution to make to the 
progress of humankind.” 
Galligan and Walsh assert that this enhancement of democratic participation through 
dual citizenship and multiple governments is undoubtedly federalism‟s most positive 
quality.  According to them, this largely explains its strength and resilience in 
Australia
87
.  Federalism preserves the States as small democratic polities, enabling the 
national strength of a large nation to be added to the enhanced participatory qualities 
of small democratic states
88
.  Related to the idea of the democratic process, a further 
strength of federalism is its capacity to secure regional autonomy and to accommodate 




“Democracy … may be centralized as well as decentralized in a static se3nse; 
but decentralisation allows a closer approach to the idea of democracy than 
centralization.  This idea is the principle of self-determination.  Democracy 
demands the utmost conformity between the general will as expressed in the 
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legal order and the will of the individuals subject to the order; this is why the 
legal order is created by the very individual who are bound by it according to 
the principle of majority.  Conformity to the order with the will of the majority 
is the aim of democratic organization.  But the central norms of the order, valid 
of the whole territory, may easily come into contradiction with the majority will 
of a group living on a partial territory.  The fact that the majority of the total 
community belongs to a certain political party, nationality, race, language, or 
religion, does not exclude the possibility that within certain partial territories the 
majority of individuals belong to another party, nationality, race, language, or 
religion.  The majority of the entire nation may be socialistic or Catholic, the 
majority of one or more provinces may be liberal or Protestant.  In order to 
diminish the possible contradiction between the contents of the legal order and 
the will of the individuals subject to it, in order to approximate as far as possible 
the ideal of democracy, it may be necessary, under certain circumstances, that 
certain noms of the legal order be valid only for certain partial territories and be 
created only by majority of votes of the individuals living in these territories.  
Under the condition that the population of the State has no uniform social 
structure, territorial division of the State territory into more or less autonomous 
provinces … may be a democratic postulate.” 
The enhancement of democratic participation in a federal system arises from the 
ordinary citizen being given multiple points of access to the government and through 
greater choice and diversity being provided.  A federal system slows for greater 
flexibility in policy choices, with the different needs of citizens in different parts of 
the country able to be met through the customisation of policies at the sub-national 
level.  For a country such as Australia the benefits of this are obvious.  The needs and 
issues of somebody living in Coober Pedy will not be the same as those of somebody 
living in Coogee, and it simply isn‟t realistic to expect a bureaucrat in Canberra to be 
responsive to these differing local concerns.  A federal system strengthens 
participatory democracy by bringing government closer to the people, allowing local 
people to have a greater say in the local decisions that directly affect them. 
Related to this discussion is also the assumption that federalism protects individuals 
because it prevents an excessive accumulation of power in either level of government.  
Sir Harry Gibbs once remarked that the most effective way to curb political power 
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was to divide it
90
.  This argument that federalism can better secure human rights and 
freedoms was supported by Sir Robert Menzies, who once declared that “in the 
division of power, in the demarcation of powers between a Central Government and 
the State Government there resides one of the true protections of individual 
freedom”91.  A similar point was made by James Madison in Federalist No. 5192: 
“In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the 
administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against 
by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments.  In the 
compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first 
divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each 
subdivided among distinct and separate departments.  Hence a double security 
arises to the rights of the people.  The different governments will control each 
other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself”. 
The idea that federalism enhances personal freedom has been bolstered under 
contemporary „public choice‟ theories by notions of „voice‟ and „exit‟93.  According 
to American federal Judge Robert Bork, the federal system enhances personal 
autonomy because “if another state allows the liberty you value, you can move there, 
and the choice of what freedom you value is yours alone, not dependent on those who 
made the Constitution.  In this sense, federalism is the constitutional guarantee most 
protective of the individual‟s freedom to make his own choices”94.  A similar point is 
made by Justice Antonin Scalia of the United States Supreme Court
95
: 
“Now there are many reasons for having a federal system, but surely the most 
important is that it produces more citizens content with the laws under which they 
live.  If, for example, the question of permitting so-called „sexually oriented 
businesses‟ – porn shops – were put to a nationwide referendum, the outcome 
might well be 51 per cent to 49 per cent, one way or the other.  If that result were 
imposed nationwide, nearly half of the population would be living under a regime 
it disapproved.  But such a huge proportion of the pro-sex-shop vote would be in 
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states such as New York, California, and Nevada; and a huge proportion of the 
anti-sex-shop vote would be in the south, and in such western states as Utah and 
New Mexico.  If the question of permitting sexually oriented businesses were left 
to the states – which is surely where the First Amendment originally left it – 
perhaps as much as 80 per cent of the population would be living under a regime 
that it approved.  Running a federal system is a lot of trouble; a large proportion 
of the time of my Court is spent sorting out federal-state relations.  It is quite 
absurd to throw away the principal benefit of that system by constitutionalizing, 
and hence federalizing, all sorts of dispositions never addressed by the text of the 
Constitution”. 
The competitive nature of a federal system is a further benefit, promoting efficiency, 
innovation and responsiveness.  Competition between State and Federal governments 
should (theoretically) encourage an overall improvement in government performance.  
Policy innovations can be tested on a smaller scale and, if these experiments fail, 
federalism “cushions the nation as a whole from the full impact of government 
blunders”96.   
The cooperation that is inevitably required between different levels of government in 
a federation should also result in better decision-making by building a heightened 
level of debate and scrutiny into the system.  This point has previously been 
emphasised by Twomey and Withers
97
: 
“The involvement of more than one government means that a proposal 
will receive a great deal more scrutiny than if it were the work of one 
government alone.  Problems with implementing the proposal in different 
parts of the country are more likely to be identified, where there is 
conflict between governments on the nature and detail of the proposal, 
there is more likely to be a public debate as different governments are 
forced to put their positions and justify them in the public domain.  While 
this has the disadvantage of sometimes slowing down reform, the need 
for cooperation has the corresponding advantage of ensuring that reform, 
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when implemented, is better considered and more moderate in its 
nature.” 
Of course, a federal system is not without its disadvantages also.  The most common 
arguments against federalism are that it is inefficient, expensive, leads to wasteful 
duplication and excessive bureaucracy, that it reduces accountability by encouraging 
“conflict and buck-passing”98 and that it is incompatible with the needs of a modern 
economy.  The first point to note in response to these criticisms is that some of the 
largest and most internationally competitive economies in the world are federations.  
A federal system is clearly not itself an impediment to economic success in a 
globalised world, or to the delivery of competitive and efficient services.  Indeed, 
recent attempts at service delivery at the Commonwealth level reinforce the point that 
centralized administration does not automatically lead to greater efficiencies, reduced 
costs, or better outcomes.  The second point is that many of the above criticisms are 
not criticisms of federalism per se, but of the way that federalism operates in 
Australia.  Reforms to the federal system may well help to address some of these 
criticisms and produce a more effective federal system.   
It is also necessary to keep in mind the advantages previously discussed when 




“A plausible response is that if federalism is complex, expensive and 
difficult, so is democracy.  In both cases, the question is not simply how 
much it costs, but what you get for the money and effort you expend ...”. 
Finally, before we can begin to minimise any examples of duplication and waste in 
our federal system it will be important to clearly identify the cause of these problems.  
In Australia, much of the unnecessary duplication and cost has actually been caused 
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“Perhaps the most popular argument of centralism ... is that federalism in 
Australia involves duplication and divided accountability in government.  
There is considerable truth in this argument.  One of its dangers for 
centralisers, however, is that much of the difficulty in this context has 
occurred because the Commonwealth, through use of its financial 
muscle, has invaded State areas, such as education and health.  Confusion 
of accountability and responsibility thus may be sheeted home to 
Commonwealth incursion, not State incompetence.  In these 
circumstances, a reasonable State response might well be that if the 
Commonwealth is prepared to vacate the field and leave the cheque 
behind, the State would be more than happy to eliminate all elements of 
division and overlap”. 
The above discussion has been designed to show that there are considerable 
advantages derived from a well-functioning federal system of government.  Given 
this, and in light of our earlier conclusion that the benefits of federalism are not being 
fully realised in Australia at present, it is timely to explore a possible agenda for 
national reform aimed at strengthening federalism, re-establishing the concept as a 
guiding constitutional value, and restoring the federal balance in Australia. 
2. A Possible Agenda for National Reform. 
The federal system in Australia has been called “dysfunctional” and in need of 
rescue
101
.  It remains our view that federalism is the right political structure for 
Australia, but it is also clear that there are significant challenges facing our federal 
system and that a process of reform offers the opportunity to improve and strengthen 
the day-to-day operation of federalism in Australia. 
This paper will discuss and recommend a number of specific reform proposals in 
relation to the following areas: 
a) the distribution of constitutional powers and responsibilities; 
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b) processes for enhancing cooperation between the various levels of Australian 
government; 
c) financial relations between Federal and State governments; and 
d) possible constitutional amendments. 
All of the proposed reforms are aimed towards what we consider to be the primary 
deficiency in the modern Australian Federation, namely the need to revitalize the 
Federation by restoring the federal balance, so as to ensure that the „federalism 
dividend‟ is fully realised for all Australians. 
a) The Distribution of Constitutional Powers and Responsibilities. 
The world has changed significantly since the Australian Constitution was drafted 
over one hundred years ago.  While the core constitutional principles and structures 
remain as relevant today as they were at the time of Federation, it is increasingly 
accepted that it would be beneficial to revisit the distribution of constitutional powers 
and responsibilities between levels of government to ensure greater clarity and to 
better reflect modern conditions.  The current Australian Federation is characterised 
by significant areas of shared responsibility, which heightens the opportunity for a 
“blurring of government responsibilities – from cost and blame-shifting among 
government levels, wasteful duplication of effort or under-provision of services, and a 
lack of effective policy coordination”102.  It is also important to note that the 
constitutional allocation of powers envisaged by the Founding Fathers – creating a 
national government with expressly defined and limited powers – has, in a number of 
significant areas, shifted considerably as a result of an approach to constitutional 
interpretation in the High Court of Australia that has consistently expanded federal 
powers.  The current constitutional division of powers is, in many respects, the worst 
of both worlds – it neither faithfully reflects the federal design of the Founding 
Fathers, nor has it fully evolved to reflect modern realities and challenges. 
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It has been suggested that a constitutional convention should be held to consider the 
distribution of constitutional powers and responsibilities in the modern context.  Any 
such reallocation of powers should aim, where possible
103
:  
“to isolate a particular area of policy and allocate it in its entirety to one 
level of government … This enhances responsibility, provides clarity to 
those who use particular services and avoids the problem of cost-shifting 
and buck-passing”. 
The principle of subsidiarity should be applied in this analysis to appropriately reflect 
Australia‟s federal nature. The word subsidiarity derives from subsidiary, which in 
turn has its roots in the Latin subsidium. Simply stated, subsidiarity means the same as 
assistance or help. It consists, therefore, in letting people do what they can do by 
themselves and, on a higher level, leaving up to the federal government what cannot 
be done by lesser circles of power. In other words, subsidiarity leaves up to the states 
(and the individual citizens) what they can do by themselves and leaves in the hands 
of the federal government only what cannot be done otherwise.
104




“… that functions should, where practical, be vested in the lowest level 
of government to ensure that their exercise is as close to the people as 
possible and reflects community preferences and local conditions … The 
principle of subsidiarity places the onus on those who seek to place a 
function with a higher level of government to make the case for it”. 
That is not to say that there is no role for the national government.  It is recognised 
that certain powers should be vested in the national government, such as where there 
are overriding national interest concerns (such as defence), where national uniformity 
is required for reasons of equity (such as social security benefits), there are significant 
economies of scale available to a national government, or where there are significant 
potential inter-jurisdictional spill-overs if a lower level of government is given 
responsibility.  When we speak of re-strengthening federalism this is not just a blanket 
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call to strengthen States rights, but rather a call to establish an effective and clear 
balance between national and State responsibilities. 
It has been suggested that the reallocation of constitutional powers could largely be 
achieved in practice without the need for formal constitutional amendment.  While 
this may be possible, and may well be the only practical way of enacting agreed 
reforms in the short to medium term, it would ultimately be preferable and proper to 
enact any proposed changes through the formal amendment procedure provided under 
s. 128.  As Twomey concluded
106
: 
“This ensures that the people are consulted and give their imprimatur to 
the change and also prevents backsliding or repudiation by future 
governments”. 
b) Processes for Enhancing Cooperation Between the Various Levels of Australian 
Government. 
Reforming the Senate 
The Senate was originally intended as the States house, but has increasingly moved 
away from this characterisation of its role.  The central role occupied by political 
parties in the Australian political system means that the primary loyalty of individual 
Senators is now generally to the political party on which their pre-selection depends, 
rather than to their home State.  Given that the same party political divide also 
permeates the State level of government it is difficult to see that devolving the power 
to appoint Senators to the State Parliaments would actually make any practical 
difference.  There are, however, other reforms that have been suggested that may help 
to give the Senate a more heightened sense of itself as a States house, and a stronger 
role in supporting the federal balance.  The first of these is the suggestion that a 
permanent Senate Standing Committee on Federal-State Relations should be 
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“That Senators be given the right to appear before the Parliament of the 
State from which they are elected, to report on a regular basis and answer 
questions on matters of concern to the State.  The intention was to make 
Senators focus more on their role as representatives of the State, as well 
as to increase their understanding of matters of importance to the States”. 
Strengthening the Council of Australian Governments 
The Council of Australian Governments (“COAG”) was established in May 1992, but 
has had an equivocal history as a mechanism for delivering national reforms.  While 
there have been some significant reforms delivered through COAG, its achievement 
have been “sporadic and unreliable” and “its effectiveness has waxed and waned 
depending upon personalities and political events”108.  There is, however, a clear need 
for better co-operative mechanisms both to deal with areas of shared responsibility in 
the federal system and to encourage a co-operative form of federalism.  The 
suggestion by the Business Council of Australia for the institutionalisation and 
strengthening of COAG is a worthy one, and a reform that could be effectively 
enacted with relative ease
109
.  The Business Council of Australia has suggested that 
this would involve strengthening the role of COAG (which would include instituting 
more regular meetings and a permanent secretariat separate from its current location 
within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet) and improving its 
accountability mechanisms.  As part of these efforts to strengthen COAG as a body 
promoting cooperative federalism it has also been suggested that “efforts should be 
made to remove the perception of COAG as a creature of the Commonwealth by 
ensuring that the timing, chairing, hosting and agendas of meetings are determined 
jointly rather than by the Commonwealth alone”110. 
It is also proposed that COAG should be given an enhanced and formalised role in 
certain policy areas.  One obvious example is the Commonwealth‟s signing and 
ratification of treaties under the external affairs power.  As discussed above
111
, the 
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external affairs power under s. 51(xxix) of the Constitution has been given an 
expansive interpretation by the High Court, allowing the Commonwealth to enter into 
treaties on a wide range of matters that may otherwise be within the exclusive domain 
of the States.  The proliferation of treaties has led to an expansion of Commonwealth 
powers at the expense of the State as “[s]imply by entering into a treaty, the 
Commonwealth Government can give the Commonwealth Parliament what is in effect 
a new head of legislative power”112. 
There are currently formal mechanism designed to encourage consultation with State 
and Territory Governments before treaties are entered into.  The key consultative 
body is the Treaties Council within COAG, while the Commonwealth-State-
Territories Standing Committee on Treaties is another potentially significant 
consultative mechanism.  COAG attempted to place the consultative process on a 
more formal footing with the adoption of the Principles and Procedures for 
Commonwealth-State Consultation on Treaties in 1996. 
While consultation is to be encouraged, the insufficient and often symbolic nature of 
the current mechanisms is evident from an examination of the Principles and 




“In the interests of achieving the best possible outcome for Australia and 
where a treaty or other international instrument is one of sensitivity and 
importance to the States and Territories, the Commonwealth should, 
wherever practicable, seek and take into account the views of the States 
and Territories, in formulating Australian negotiating policy, and before 
becoming a party to, or indicating acceptance of, that treaty or 
instrument.” 
The use of phrases such as “wherever possible” and “take into account” highlights the 
discretionary and largely symbolic nature of the consultative mechanism.  It is the 
States who are frequently charged with implementing the international obligations 
entered into by the Commonwealth, and yet the Commonwealth is free to enter into 
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obligations directly impacting upon the States over and above their objections.  While 
recognising that it is necessary to speak with one voice at the international level and 
that only the Commonwealth Government can ultimately have responsibility for 
entering into treaties on behalf of Australia, it is submitted that the States should be 
given a more substantive role in this process.  This could be done either by providing 
for a process of approval by Sate Parliaments or, recognising the delays that might 
result from the previous suggestion, by requiring that the Treaties Council within 
COAG be given a more substantive role in the treaty process.  This may include a 
power of veto where a treat is one that impacts on areas of State activity. 
c) Financial Relations Between Federal and State Governments 
Probably the area in which reform is most urgently needed is in the financial relations 
between federal and state governments.  This federal-state relationship has been 
characterised by an ever-increasing accumulation of financial power on the part of the 
federal government and ever-decreasing claims to financial independence on the part 
of the state governments.  The States have become “institutionalized beggars”114 – a 
somewhat crude, and yet accurate, assessment of the current situation.  Alfred 
Deakin‟s prescient claim that the States were “legally free, but financially bound to 
the chariot wheels of Central Government”115 presents a realistic picture of the current 
state of affairs. 
This increasingly unequal financial relationship has potentially broader consequences 
for the federal balance in terms of the allocation of responsibilities.  The limited 
financial capacities of the States as compared to the Commonwealth tend to fuel 
arguments that the Commonwealth should enter areas that have traditionally been 
State responsibilities.  As Twomey has observed
116
: 
“It is disingenuous to suggest that the States are failing in their 
responsibilities because they require Commonwealth funding and that the 
Commonwealth should therefore take over State policy functions, when 
this is the system that the Commonwealth deliberately created”. 
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The financial relations between federal and state governments, and proposals for 
reform, will be considered below in terms of the growing vertical fiscal imbalance, 
the increasing reliance on specific purpose payments, and the need to revisit the extent 
of horizontal fiscal equity. 
Reducing Vertical Fiscal Imbalance 
The term vertical fiscal imbalance (“VFI”) “is the term used to describe a mis-match 
between the revenue raising powers and expenditure responsibilities of each level of 
government, where a short-fall in revenue for one level of government (typically the 
regional level) is made up for by grants funded from the surplus revenue of the other 
(typically the central government)”117.  In a federal system some level of VFI is 
realistically to be expected,
118
 but it is broadly seen as desirable to aim for an 
approximate level of fiscal equivalence, where the revenue raising powers and 
expenditure responsibilities of each level of government are balanced.  The central 
advantage of fiscal equivalence is that it “enhances accountability and responsibility, 
as the same government has to make the hard choices related to balancing tax and 
expenditure levels”119. 
The Australian federal system is characterised by one of the highest levels of VFI 
amongst federal systems across the world.  The result of this is that the States are 
increasingly dependent on the national government for funding.  For example, the 
WA Department of Treasury and Finance has estimated that the WA government 
relies on the national government for approximately 50% of its total operating 
revenue
120
.  Statistics from the Australian Bureau of Statistics in 2005 showed that the 
national government directly collected approximately 82% of taxes, of which 
approximately 27% is transferred back to State governments.  On the other hand, 
State governments undertake 40% of public spending in Australia, evidencing a 
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121.  This comparatively high level of VFI “largely reflects the erosion 
since Federation of the States‟ revenue powers as seen in the transfer of income taxes 
to the national government, the abolition of a range of State taxes under the 1999 
Intergovernmental Agreement on the Reform of Commonwealth-State Financial 
Relations (“IGA”), and the broad interpretation given to section 90 of the 
Constitution by the High Court of Australia”122. 
Such a stark degree of VFI is not desirable.  Their increasing reliance on grants from 
the national government means that the States are, to a growing extent, no longer the 
masters of their own financial destiny.  This has a number of consequences including, 
as described above, a reduction in accountability and fiscal responsibility.  It also 
“exposes State government to budget uncertainty vis-à-vis Australian government 
decisions about the level of grants”123, allows the national government to use its 
heightened fiscal leverage to force its way into policy areas traditionally reserved to 
the States, and also “reduces incentive for States to put in place growth promoting 
policies and infrastructure, as the tax benefits flow primarily to the 
Commonwealth”124. 
The IGA, which was signed by the Federal and State Governments in June 1999, was 
meant to improve this situation by providing the States with access to a growth 
revenue stream by the Federal Government agreeing to allocate GST revenues to the 
States.  The WA Department of Treasury and Finance argues, however, that this has 
actually increased the financial dependence of State Governments on the Federal 
Government, observing that under the IGA “… the States have abolished a number of 
their own taxes … so that there are less revenue sources under the State‟s direct 
control”125 and that “States cannot choose (individually or collectively) to increase 
their revenue from the GST because the GST is an Australian Government tax and the 
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IGA provides that amendments to the GST require unanimous agreement of the 
Australian Government and all State Governments”126. 
A number of reforms aimed at reducing the VFI within the Australian federal system 
have been suggested over the years.  These tend to involve either providing state 
governments with a greater share of overall taxation revenue or enhancing the ability 
of state governments to raise their own funds.  One such suggestion is for the States to 
impose their own personal income tax.  There is no constitutional impediment to the 
States collecting income tax, and in fact they did so prior to 1942.  This is not an 
unusual arrangement with, for example, state and provincial governments in the USA 
and Canada collecting their own personal income taxes in addition to income taxes 
levied by the national government.  This would have the advantage of reducing VFI 
and reducing the financial reliance of the States on Commonwealth transfers, however 
the Business Council of Australia has warned that “any increase in the tax bases of 
States would need to be offset by equivalent reductions in Commonwealth taxes” and 
that there would be a need to avoid “the potential for increased administrative burdens 
dealing with a more fragmented tax system”127. 
An alternative reform proposal – which would still achieve the aim of reducing VFI 
while also addressing concerns about the overall tax burden and avoiding additional 
administrative burdens – is to introduce a formal tax-sharing arrangement, with the 
States provided with a guaranteed percentage of Commonwealth tax revenue.  In 
addition to reducing VFI this would also have the benefit of providing all States with 
a direct interest in the economic success of all other States, with increasing economic 
growth directly benefiting them through corresponding increases in taxation revenues.  
A formal tax-sharing arrangement would likely also reduce State reliance on specific 
purpose payments by increasing the revenue available to them on an unconditional 
basis, which is itself a considerable benefit for reasons expanded upon below. 
Reducing Specific Purpose Payments 
The expansion of specific purpose payments (“SPPs”) has further eroded the 
financial independence of the States and allowed the Commonwealth to enter into 
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policy areas that have previously been the exclusive provinces of the States.  The 
conditions that are attached by the Commonwealth to these payments effectively 
allow the Commonwealth to impose policy directions and programs on the States, 
without the limitation of requiring any connection to specific Commonwealth 
constitutional heads of power.  They also significantly constrain State discretion and 
freedom in allocating their own budgets and designing their own programs.  The use 
of SPPs continues to increase.  As Twomey and Withers outlined
128
: 
“In the 2006-07 financial year there [were] at least 90 distinct SPP 
programs providing $28 billion to the States or directly to non-
government schools and local governments.  SPPs account for 42% of 
total payments made by the Commonwealth to the States.  The 
requirements in many SPPs that States match funding and maintain 
existing efforts means that up to 33% of State budget outlays can be 
effectively controlled by SPPs, reducing State budget flexibility”. 
The increased use of SPPs has obvious consequences for the federal balance, with 
Professor Ross Garnaut commenting that
129
: 
“There is a sense in which [SPPs] have completely undermined the 
federal character of government in Australia”. 
SPPs allow the Commonwealth to assert “financial and policy control over the States” 
and “are the primary cause of duplication, excessive administrative burdens, blame-
shifting and waste in our federal system”130.  Reducing the use of SPPs in favour of 
general purpose grants should be a priority for the reform of the Australian federation. 
Revising Horizontal Fiscal Equalization 
In addition to its comparatively high degree of VFI the Australian Federation is also 
characterised by a high degree of horizontal fiscal equalization (“HFE”).  The 
Commonwealth Grants Commission applies the HFE principle when advising the 
Commonwealth government on the allocation of GST revenue between the States.  It 
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describes the principle of fiscal equalisation as requiring that “each State should be 
given the capacity to provide the average standard of State-type public services, 
assuming it does so at an average level of operational efficiency and makes an 
average effort to raise revenue from its own sources”131.  In simple terms, it is an 
attempt to adjust Commonwealth transfers to the States to equalize the capacity of 
both weaker and stronger States to provide services to their citizens. 
While most recognise that “mechanisms that assist fiscally weaker States are 
generally considered to be fair and conducive to a well functioning federation”132 
there are also costs and disadvantages attached to this process.  Most importantly, the 
equalization process “provides great disincentives for sub-national governments to 
seek and provide efficient delivery of government services”133.  The current system 
has been estimated to create “deadweight losses of between $150 and $280 million 
per annum”134. 
There is also increasing concern being expressed about the current equalisation 
formula and particularly its failure to adequately recognise the infrastructure costs and 
related pressures that are being experienced by States with high levels of economic 
growth.  The argument for reform is being driven most strongly by Western Australia, 
with the Premier of Western Australia recently observing that changes announced to 
the Commonwealth Grants Commission funding formula would “short-change” 
Western Australia in that it would
135
: 
“… strip $443 million from WA‟s share of GST funding next year … 
Under this proposal, for every dollar Western Australians pay in GST 
they will only be receiving 68 cents back.  Meanwhile people in New 
South Wales will receive a return of 95 cents, Victorians will receive 93 
cents and Queenslanders will receive a return of 91 cents”. 
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Premier Barnett stated that if Western Australia received an equal per capita share of 
the GST the State “would be $1.5 billion better off in 2010-11”136, and noted that 
within three years, using the amended funding formula “… for every dollar of GST 
that Western Australians pay at the register, we will only get back 57 cents”137. 
There is considerable merit in the proposal by the Premier of Western Australia that a 
floor should be applied to the equalization formula, with a States share of GST 
revenues unable to fall below that minimum level.  An amount of 75 cents in the 
dollar has been proposed.  While some level of equalization is broadly accepted as 
being in the broader national interest and as the price of being a member of the 
Federation, there does seem to be a point at which the costs outweigh the benefits, the 
disincentives limiting growth-creating policies and investment begin to negatively 
affect our future economic prosperity, and where there is a real risk of a growing 
resentment amongst citizens in the fiscally stronger States that may undermine 
national unity. 
d) Possible Constitutional Amendments 
Federalism as an Express Constitutional Principle 
There are numerous examples of federalism, and the need to maintain the federal 
balance, being recognised as a foundational principle informing the Australian 
Constitution and resulting governmental structure.  The most explicit reference is 
found in the Preamble, which refers to the people agreeing “to unite in one 
indissoluble Federal Commonwealth”.  Similarly, s. 3 of the Commonwealth of 
Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) refers to the people of the several Australian 
colonies being “united in a Federal Constitution”.   
There are also numerous references to federalism as a constitutional value that should 
inform our reading of the Constitution and the interpretation of the respective powers 
of the different levels of government.  For example, Chief Justice Gibbs recognised in 
Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen that “in determining the meaning and scope of a power 
conferred by section 51 it is necessary to have regard to the federal nature of the 
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Constitution”138.  That view was also expressed in the same case by Justice 
Stephen
139
.  In Queensland Electricity Commission v The Commonwealth Chief 
Justice Gibbs recognised that “the purpose of the Constitution was to establish a 
Federation” and, again, concluded that “the federal nature of the Constitution” 
imposed limits upon the powers granted by s. 51
140
.  Cooperation between the 
Commonwealth and State governments was considered by Justice Deane to be “a 
positive objective of the Constitution” in R v Duncan; ex parte Australian Iron & 
Steel Pty Ltd
141
.   
The dissenting judges in the Work Choices Case also emphasised the federal nature of 
the Constitution.  Justice Kirby stated that the High Court “needs to give respect to the 
federal character of the Constitution”142.  In a similar vein, Justice Callinan concluded 
that “the Constitution mandates a federal balance”, calling this “a powerful 
constitutional implication”143.  
There is, however, considerable evidence suggesting that federalism is not generally 
accepted as an entrenched constitutional principle that necessarily informs the 
interpretation of the Constitution.  The majority judges in Work Choices emphasised 
that the starting point when interpreting the Constitution will necessarily be “the 
constitutional text, rather than a view of the place of the States that is formed 
independently of that text”144.  This reflects the earlier statement of the Court in the 
Engineers Case that the Constitution should not be interpreted by reference to “a 
vague, individual conception of the spirit of the compact”145.  More expressly, in Re 
Wakim; Ex parte McNally, Justice McHugh emphasised that “cooperative federalism 
is not a constitutional term.  It is a political slogan, not a criterion of constitutional 
validity or power”146. 
                                                 
138
  (1982) 153 CLR 168, 199. 
139
  Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168, 216. 
140
  (1985) 159 CLR 192, 205. 
141
  R v Duncan; Ex parte Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1983) 158 CLR 535, at 589. 
142
  New South Wales v Commonwealth (Work Choices Case) (2006) 229 CLR 1, 229. 
143
  Ibid, 333. 
144
  Ibid, 118-119. 
145
  (1920) 28 CLR 129, 145. 
146
  Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511, 556. 
52 
 
Professor Andrew Lynch and Professor George Williams have argued that federalism 
is “not viewed as a constitutional value sufficiently anchored in the text”147 and have 
suggested that an express „constitutional mandate‟ is required before the principle will 
be formally recognised as a factor properly to be applied in the task of constitutional 
interpretation.  As they have observed
148
: 
“… it seems that the weight of precedent will prevent the High Court 
departing anytime soon from the orthodoxy that the Constitution‟s 
establishment of a federal system does not provide a sufficient basis for 
consideration of the relationship between the Commonwealth and States 
as a factor in the interpretation of their respective powers …”.  
It is our view that a „constitutional mandate‟ could be achieved by the inserting into 
the constitution express recognition of federalism as a guiding constitutional value 
and of the maintenance of the federal balance as a factor that must be applied when 
interpreting the Constitution and (in particular) the scope of Commonwealth powers.  
An expressed reference in the constitutional text would go some way to redressing the 
significant expansion of Commonwealth powers that has been facilitated by the 
generally centralist approach of the High Court towards constitutional questions.  It 
would help to ensure that federalism is “transformed from assumption and aspiration 
into constitutional text”149 and to address the current problem of the federal character 
of the Constitution being too readily ignored in the interpretation of this foundational 
document. 
The Appointment of High Court Justices 
As the “keystone of the federal arch”150 the High Court of Australia is charged with 
being the final arbiter in constitutional disputes, including disputes between the States 
and Commonwealth as to the limits of their respective powers.  Under s. 72(i) of the 
Constitution the Justices of the High Court are appointed by the Governor-General in 
Council.  With all High Court appointments being made by the Commonwealth 
government it is entirely unsurprising that the High Court has, over time, been 
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broadly sympathetic towards the expansion of Commonwealth powers.  The 
appointment of the neutral umpire by one of the two competing teams would never be 
allowed in any of our professional sporting codes.  It is difficult to see why it should 
be allowed to occur in relation to the much more important task of appointments to 
the High Court of Australia. 
There have been periodic calls for States to be given a role in the appointment of High 
Court Justices, with a variety of mechanisms being suggested.  The issue has been 
acknowledged to an extent by s. 6 of the High Court of Australia Act 1979 (Cth), 
which is entitled „Consultation with State Attorneys-General on appointment of 
Justices‟ and provides: 
“Where there is a vacancy in the office of Justice, the Attorney-General 
shall, before an appointment is made to the vacant office, consult with 
the Attorneys-General of the States in relation to the appointment”. 
While s. 6 acknowledges the need to provide the States with some input into the 
appointment process, it is nothing more than a symbolic gesture.  There is nothing 
requiring the consultation process to be anything other than cursory, and nothing to 
guarantee the States any substantive input into the eventual outcome. 
It is difficult to argue against the general proposition that both Commonwealth and 
State governments should have some role in the appointment of High Court Justices.  
Under the Constitution neither level of government is „superior‟ to the other, and with 
the Court granted original jurisdiction in all matters of constitutional dispute between 
the Commonwealth and the States
151
 and exercising appellate jurisdiction over the 
State Supreme Courts
152
, the States have as much of a direct interest as the 
Commonwealth government in appointments to the Court.  Three primary objections 
that seem to have been raised most frequently against this general proposition, with 
each of these being directly addressed by Craven in his paper ‘Reforming the High 
Court’153. 
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The first is that “it would lead to an orgy of political horse-trading behind closed 
doors”154.  Craven argues that while this may be true to some extent, it can surely be 
no different to what occurs at the moment within the Cabinet and Party Rooms. 
The second is that the involvement of the States would inevitably produce 
compromise candidates.  To this, Craven observes
155
: 
“This may be true, but it is not clear why it is undesirable.  It may well be 
that the best candidates in practice are those who enjoy a significant 
degree of confidence among a wide range of Governments and their 
Attorneys, rather than those who arouse the unbridled passion of the 
Commonwealth government alone.” 
The third common objection is that involving the States “would give undue 
prominence to regional considerations”156.  In response, Craven stated:157 
“… one could be forgiven for believing that „regional considerations‟ 
should be given a very greater prominence in the appointment of High 
Court Justices, on the grounds that the States and the Commonwealth in 
reality have a roughly equal interest in the operation of the Court”. 
If we accept that the States, as a matter of general principle, should be granted a 
substantive voice in the appointment of High Court Justices, the question then 
becomes one of the appropriate mechanism.  The challenge here is to find a system of 
appointment that allows the States a substantive role whilst still maintaining the 
overall integrity of the appointment process.  After considering a range of reform 
proposals submitted in various forms over the years, it is our view that the most 
practical proposal is the one originally put forward by the Queensland Government in 
1983 to the Australian Constitutional Convention.  This proposal has subsequently 
been endorsed by Professor Gabriel Moens, who described it as follows
158
: 
“… upon a vacancy occurring on the High Court bench, the 
Commonwealth Attorney-General asks the State Attorneys-General 
                                                 
154
  Ibid. 
155
  Ibid. 
156
  Ibid. 
157
  Ibid. 
158
  G Moens, “The Role of the States in High Court Appointments”, in Upholding the Australian 
Constitution (Proceedings of The Samuel Griffith Society Conference, vol. 2, 1997). 
55 
 
for suggestions of possible appointees.  The Commonwealth itself 
may then submit suggestions of potential appointees to the scrutiny of 
the State Attorneys-General.  From this consultation the 
Commonwealth would gain a clear idea about which candidates met 
with State approval or disapproval.  High Court vacancies could only 
be filled with prospective appointees of whom the Commonwealth 
government approved and of whom three (or more) State governments 
had expressed positive approval or had not expressed an opinion 
upon” 
There are a number of advantages to this proposal.  Most importantly, it would be a 
step towards restoring the federal balance by ensuring that both Commonwealth and 
State governments play a substantive role in the appointment process.  It may also be 
the case that – far from leading inevitably to „compromise candidates‟ – the new 
process may ultimately result in candidacies of equal, or even better, quality.  The 
proposed model would require real consultation, and as Craven observed
159
:  
“… the general point must be that it is far from clear why we should be 
so eager to rely upon the judgment of a single government in choosing a 
High Court Justice as the best guarantee of quality, rather than the 
collected wisdom of a number of governments”. 
Proposing Constitutional Amendments: 
A similar issue has been raised in relation to the initiation of referenda proposing 
constitutional amendments.  Under the present amendment procedures only the 
Commonwealth government has the power to initiate a referendum regarding a 
proposed constitutional amendment.  Given this, it is hardly surprising to note that of 
the 44 amendment proposals put forward under s. 128 of the Constitution, over half of 
them (23 to be exact) have attempted to expand Commonwealth powers.  Further, 
these proposals have proven consistently unpopular amongst the Australian people, 
with only two of the 23 proposals being approved
160
.  As Goldsworthy has noted
161
: 
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“No Commonwealth government has ever sponsored a constitutional 
amendment to reduce Commonwealth powers, and none is ever likely to 
do so”. 
Not allowing the States to initiate referenda has obvious negative consequences for 
the federal balance by effectively excluding proposals that suggest that 
Commonwealth government powers be limited.  It is difficult to see the justification 
for excluding the States from this process.  As Goldsworthy observed
162
: 
“Although each State may represent only part of the nation, they are all 
very important parts, and together they constitute almost all of it.  
Moreover, the whole point of a federation is that its parts have 
constitutional standing, and guaranteed rights and powers.  The parts no 
less than the whole are legitimate stake-holders in any federal 
constitution.  If a majority of those parts believe that the constitution 
could be approved, why should they not be able to put their case directly 
to the people?” 
The proposal to amend the Constitution to allow States to initiate referenda has been 
previously endorsed.  It formed one of the recommendations of the Final Report of the 
Constitutional Commission
163
 and has been approvingly referred to by academics 
such as Professor Goldsworthy
164
 and Associate Professor Anne Twomey
165
.  To 
prevent a sudden rush of frivolous amendment proposals, and recognising the 
significant costs involved in holding a referendum, it is generally acknowledged that a 
minimum number of State Parliaments should be required to approve the proposed 
amendment in identical terms before it is put to the people for approval.  The Final 
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“A proposal to alter the Constitution would be required to come from the 
Parliaments of not fewer than half the States.  There should be an 
additional requirement that the State Parliaments concerned represent a 
majority of Australians overall.  It would be a requirement that the 
proposed alteration be passed in identical terms by the State Parliaments 
concerned within a 12 month period.  The proposed alteration would be 
required to be put to referendum not less than two months nor more than 
six months after this requirement was satisfied.” 
We would agree with this recommendation, with the exception of the requirement that 
the State Parliaments concerned represent a majority of Australians overall.  Including 
that requirement will greatly diminish the impact of this proposal, as it would 
effectively mean that the smaller states would be completely unable to propose 
constitutional referenda unless they had the support of either New South Wales or 
Victoria.  If this majority requirement is included the proposal will have a 
significantly reduced impact in terms of promoting a strong federal system. 
Allowing the States to initiate referenda is a reform that addresses the 
overwhelmingly centralist-tendency of past referenda, strengthens the Federation, and 
would “enhance the right of the people to determine the content of their 
Constitution”167.  As noted by Goldsworthy168: 
“The States as well as the Commonwealth make up the federal system, and 
have an equal stake in its proper functioning and an intimate knowledge of 
its day to day operations.  They are as well placed as the Commonwealth 
to detect structural deficiencies which need reform, deficiencies which for 
reasons of its own the Commonwealth might not want to rectify.  To 
prevent the people from rectifying such deficiencies is unfair to them even 
more than it is unfair to the States.” 
Conclusion 
This submission has identified a number of key issues and priorities for the reform of 
the Australian Federation.  We strongly believe that a federal system of government 
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remains the best political structure for Australia, however the continual expansion of 
Commonwealth powers has resulted in a Federation far removed from that originally 
envisaged by the framers.  Along the way, many of the advantages of federalism have 
either been lost, or are not being realised to their full extent.  The reforms suggested in 
this paper are designed to improve and strengthen the day-to-day operation of 
federalism in Australia, primarily by restoring the federal balance between the Federal 
and State levels of government.  It is clear that there are significant challenges facing 
our federal system, with a national process of reform offering the opportunity to 
revitalize the Federation and ensure that the „federal dividend‟ is fully realised for all 
Australians. 
 
 
